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   The	  famous	  Bretton	  Woods	  conference	  was	  held	  in	  New	  Hampshire	  in	  July	  1944,	  attended	  by	  
representatives	  from	  44	  nations	  with	  the	  objective	  and	  the	  result	  of	  designing	  an	  international	  
monetary	  and	  financial	  system	  for	  the	  post	  World	  War	  II	  era.	  	  “Bretton	  Woods,”	  like	  the	  Marshall	  Plan,	  
has	  become	  a	  metaphor	  for	  a	  major	  international	  success,	  in	  this	  case	  resulting	  from	  a	  formal	  
conference.	  	  There	  have	  been	  many	  calls	  for	  a	  “new	  Bretton	  Woods”	  since	  then,	  most	  recently	  in	  2011	  
by	  President	  Sarkozy	  of	  France,	  to	  revamp	  or	  at	  least	  to	  improve	  the	  international	  monetary	  system.	  
	   The	  context	  of	  the	  1944	  conference	  is	  important.	  	  There	  was	  a	  war	  on.	  The	  turning	  points	  in	  the	  
war	  came	  in	  late	  1942	  at	  Stalingrad,	  Guadacanal,	  and	  North	  Africa,	  where	  the	  offensives	  by	  Germany,	  
Japan,	  and	  Italy	  were	  definitively	  blunted.	  But	  it	  was	  still	  10-­‐13	  months	  before	  their	  final	  defeat.	  	  When	  
the	  conference	  opened	  on	  July	  1,	  France	  had	  begun	  to	  be	  liberated	  from	  German	  occupation	  three	  
weeks	  earlier,	  and	  Japan’s	  inner	  defense	  perimeter	  had	  been	  breached	  with	  the	  invasion	  of	  Saipan	  in	  
the	  Marianas.	  But	  Anglo-­‐American	  planning	  for	  the	  postwar	  international	  monetary	  system	  had	  been	  
started	  over	  two	  years	  earlier,	  when	  the	  United	  Nations	  (as	  they	  had	  come	  to	  be	  called)	  were	  still	  very	  
much	  on	  the	  defensive.	  	  It	  was	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  confidence	  of	  Franklin	  Roosevelt	  in	  the	  ultimate	  
outcome	  of	  the	  war	  that	  his	  administration	  began	  systematically	  to	  plan	  for	  postwar	  arrangements.	  	  
Winston	  Churchill	  was	  more	  skeptical	  of	  any	  attention	  diverted	  from	  maximizing	  the	  war	  effort,	  but	  
tolerated	  the	  forward-­‐looking	  John	  Maynard	  Keynes	  and	  his	  team	  (which	  included	  Lionel	  Robbins,	  James	  
Meade,	  and	  Richard	  Stone)	  in	  the	  UK	  government.	  	  It	  was	  during	  this	  period	  too	  that	  planning	  began	  for	  
what	  later	  became	  the	  United	  Nations	  Organization	  and	  postwar	  arrangements	  for	  international	  trade,	  
eventuating	  in	  the	  General	  Agreement	  on	  Tariffs	  and	  Trade	  after	  the	  International	  Trade	  Organization	  
was	  killed	  by	  a	  Republican-­‐dominated	  US	  Senate.	  
	   	  Much	  has	  been	  written	  about	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  conference,	  its	  antecedents	  and	  successors	  
(see	  especially	  the	  classic	  book	  by	  Gardner	  and	  the	  much	  more	  recent	  one	  by	  Steil).	  	  But	  the	  actual	  
transcripts	  of	  the	  Conference	  lay	  passively	  in	  US	  Treasury	  archives	  for	  over	  sixty	  years.	  	  They	  are	  here	  
published	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  Despite	  yeoman	  work	  by	  the	  editors	  to	  help	  make	  them	  more	  accessible	  
through	  a	  fine	  introduction	  and	  insertions	  and	  cross-­‐references,	  they	  make	  difficult	  and	  for	  non-­‐
specialists	  disappointing	  reading.	  The	  transcripts	  themselves	  reflect	  write-­‐ups	  of	  stenographic	  notes	  of	  
the	  actual	  discourse	  in	  the	  meetings	  of	  the	  main	  committees	  and	  sub-­‐committees,	  along	  with	  minutes	  of	  
other	  meetings,	  and	  they	  reflect	  the	  disjointedness	  of	  any	  dialogue	  among	  many	  parties,	  even	  in	  tightly	  
run	  meetings.	  
	   There	  were	  359	  persons	  present	  in	  the	  Conference	  (including	  39	  conference	  staff	  and	  10	  
observers),	  of	  which	  41	  from	  21	  countries	  were	  active	  participants	  in	  the	  discussions.	  (This	  compares	  
with	  several	  thousand	  persons	  accredited	  to	  many	  UN	  conferences	  these	  days.)	  	  While	  Americans	  and	  
Britons	  dominated	  the	  meetings,	  which	  were	  focused	  on	  documents	  that	  had	  been	  drafted	  in	  an	  
immediately	  preceding	  inter-­‐governmental	  meeting	  in	  Atlantic	  City,	  and	  that	  in	  turn	  reflected	  two	  years	  
of	  trans-­‐Atlantic	  dialogue,	  numerous	  changes	  were	  made	  in	  response	  to	  proposals	  from	  others.	  
Decisions	  were	  made	  by	  consensus	  rather	  than	  by	  formal	  votes	  (on	  pronouncement	  by	  the	  chairman	  
that	  there	  were	  no	  strong	  objections),	  a	  procedure	  that	  is	  still	  usefully	  used	  in	  the	  International	  
Monetary	  Fund	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  today,	  but	  is	  less	  useful	  in	  larger	  UN	  conferences	  where	  a	  few	  
strong	  objectors	  –	  on	  whatever	  grounds	  –	  can	  block	  action.	  	  The	  USSR	  was	  represented	  at	  Bretton	  
Woods	  and	  signed	  the	  agreement,	  but	  declined	  later	  to	  ratify	  the	  agreement	  and	  did	  not	  join	  the	  IMF	  or	  
the	  IBRD.	  
	   The	  main	  purpose	  of	  the	  conference	  had	  been	  to	  establish	  the	  rules	  for	  exchange	  rate	  
management	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  what	  became	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  to	  oversee	  and	  
facilitate	  the	  rules.	  	  But	  there	  was	  so	  much	  consensus	  at	  the	  Atlantic	  City	  meeting	  on	  the	  need	  for	  
official	  support	  for	  international	  capital	  flows	  after	  the	  war	  that	  what	  became	  the	  International	  Bank	  for	  
Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  (IBRD,	  known	  these	  days	  with	  its	  sister	  institutions	  as	  the	  World	  Bank)	  
was	  added	  to	  the	  agenda.	  	  
	   Keynes	  was	  no	  doubt	  the	  most	  luminous	  figure	  at	  the	  Conference,	  which	  was	  chaired	  by	  the	  US	  
Secretary	  of	  Treasury	  Henry	  Morganthau	  and	  included	  Harry	  Dexter	  White,	  his	  subordinate	  who	  was	  the	  
main	  architect	  of	  the	  IMF	  Agreement,	  and	  Dean	  Acheson,	  who	  was	  the	  principal	  US	  negotiator	  on	  the	  
IBRD.	  But	  the	  attendees	  included	  many	  other	  luminaries,	  seven	  of	  whom	  later	  became	  presidents	  or	  
prime	  ministers	  of	  their	  countries,	  many	  of	  whom	  became	  finance	  ministers	  or	  central	  bank	  governors,	  
and	  many	  of	  whom	  later	  occupied	  important	  positions	  in	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  World	  Bank.	  
	   Curiously,	  Keynes	  appears	  very	  little	  in	  the	  transcripts,	  although	  his	  role	  by	  all	  testimony	  was	  
critical	  outside	  the	  formal	  meetings.	  	  He	  chaired	  the	  committee	  on	  the	  IBRD,	  which	  he	  ran	  efficiently	  to	  
the	  point	  of	  brusqeness,	  but	  left	  to	  others	  British	  contributions	  to	  discussions	  on	  the	  IMF,	  which	  was	  his	  
real	  interest,	  and	  over	  which	  he	  lost	  most	  of	  his	  substantive	  battles	  with	  White	  (see	  Steil).	  
	   Economists	  interested	  in	  substantive	  issues	  will	  largely	  be	  disappointed	  by	  the	  transcripts.	  	  As	  
noted,	  much	  preparatory	  work	  had	  already	  been	  done,	  and	  by	  the	  Conference	  most	  of	  them	  seem	  to	  
have	  been	  decided	  already,	  or	  were	  neglected.	  	  For	  example,	  countries	  were	  to	  fix	  the	  parities	  of	  their	  
currencies,	  implying	  fixed	  exchange	  rates	  with	  little	  room	  for	  variation	  around	  parity.	  	  No	  one	  discussed	  
floating	  exchange	  rates,	  experience	  with	  which	  in	  the	  early	  1920s	  and	  again	  in	  the	  1930s	  had	  recently	  
been	  documented	  and	  thoroughly	  condemned	  by	  Ragnar	  Nurkse	  (who	  attended	  the	  Conference	  as	  an	  
observer	  from	  the	  League	  of	  Nations).	  	  “Flexibility”	  in	  exchange	  rates	  meant	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  
parities	  could	  be	  changed,	  and	  on	  who’s	  authority,	  not	  market	  flexibility.	  Again	  with	  the	  interwar	  
experience	  in	  mind,	  the	  desirability	  for	  national	  controls	  on	  international	  movements	  of	  capital	  was	  
widely	  accepted.	  A	  source	  of	  discussion	  was	  whether	  remittances,	  especially	  important	  to	  India,	  should	  
be	  considered	  current	  or	  capital	  transactions;	  the	  former	  won	  out.	  	  	  
The	  transcripts	  largely	  cover	  procedural	  decisions:	  the	  allocation	  of	  controversial	  issues	  to	  ad	  
hoc	  subcommittees	  for	  which	  transcripts	  do	  not	  exist,	  followed	  by	  reports	  back	  to	  senior	  committees	  
which	  approved	  (or,	  more	  rarely,	  disapproved)	  the	  language	  agreed	  upon	  in	  the	  sub-­‐committees.	  
	   More	  interesting	  perhaps	  are	  the	  issues	  raised	  but	  not	  covered	  in	  the	  final	  agreement.	  	  Mexico	  
proposed	  an	  active	  role	  for	  silver	  in	  the	  international	  monetary	  system.	  	  Australia	  proposed	  that	  all	  
member	  countries	  accept	  an	  international	  obligation	  to	  maintain	  a	  high	  level	  of	  employment.	  	  Egypt,	  
strongly	  supported	  by	  India,	  proposed	  to	  make	  fully	  convertible	  the	  large	  sterling	  balances	  accumulated	  
(mainly	  by	  British	  dependencies)	  during	  the	  war.	  	  Poland	  proposed	  to	  make	  international	  rules	  regarding	  
the	  restoration	  of	  property	  that	  was	  looted	  or	  confiscated	  during	  the	  war.	  	  Norway	  proposed	  to	  abolish	  
the	  Bank	  for	  International	  Settlements.	  	  India	  proposed	  to	  have	  the	  IMF	  facilitate	  economic	  
development	  (an	  issue	  that	  was	  transferred	  to	  the	  IBRD,	  as	  reflected	  in	  its	  name).	  
	   Understandably,	  much	  attention	  was	  devoted	  to	  issues	  likely	  to	  be	  salient	  in	  the	  immediate	  
postwar	  period,	  which	  in	  discussion	  had	  to	  be	  balanced	  against	  the	  longer-­‐term	  purposes	  of	  the	  new	  
system.	  Also,	  as	  usual	  in	  international	  negotiations,	  distributional	  questions	  played	  a	  prominent	  role,	  
here,	  especially	  the	  allocation	  of	  IMF	  quotas	  (desired,	  since	  they	  would	  define	  credit	  lines)	  and	  IBRD	  
subscriptions	  (undesired,	  since	  they	  involved	  putting	  up	  scarce	  capital),	  and	  the	  location	  of	  the	  two	  new	  
institutions.	  
	   Gold	  had	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  international	  monetary	  system	  before	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  
with	  an	  attempt	  to	  revive	  it	  in	  attenuated	  form	  in	  the	  gold	  exchange	  standard	  of	  the	  late	  1920s.	  	  Despite	  
Keynes’	  earlier	  description	  of	  monetary	  gold	  as	  “a	  barbarous	  relic,”	  its	  hold	  on	  participants,	  or	  at	  least	  
their	  preoccupation	  with	  gold,	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  mentioned	  in	  one	  context	  or	  another	  on	  
fully	  one	  quarter	  of	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  transcripts.	  	  	  
Curiously,	  the	  two	  key	  features	  of	  any	  international	  monetary	  system	  –	  how	  balance	  of	  
payments	  adjustment	  is	  to	  take	  place,	  and	  how	  international	  liquidity	  is	  to	  be	  provided	  –	  do	  not	  appear	  
explicitly	  in	  these	  transcripts.	  	  The	  former	  is	  imperfectly	  implicit	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  “flexibility”	  in	  
changing	  par	  values;	  and	  the	  latter	  is	  not	  covered	  at	  all	  except	  through	  an	  obscure	  reference	  to	  “uniform	  
change	  in	  par	  values,”	  i.e.	  a	  change	  in	  the	  price	  of	  gold.	  
	   Large	  and	  complex	  systems	  in	  reality	  evolve	  through	  time	  in	  response	  to	  changing	  circumstances	  
and	  opportunities,	  not	  through	  some	  grand	  design.	  	  Bretton	  Woods	  represented	  a	  unique	  opportunity	  
to	  design	  a	  new	  international	  monetary	  system	  (almost)	  from	  scratch,	  given	  the	  unhappy	  and	  not-­‐to-­‐be	  
repeated	  experiences	  of	  the	  interwar	  period	  followed	  by	  World	  War.	  Such	  circumstances	  are	  not	  likely	  
to	  be	  repeated,	  so	  we	  still	  live	  with	  the	  imperfect	  legacy	  of	  Bretton	  Woods.	  	  Both	  par	  values	  and	  gold	  
have	  greatly	  receded	  in	  importance,	  but	  the	  institutional	  structures	  created	  there	  remain.	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